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SECTION 558(c) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT: IS A FORMAL HEARING TO DEMONSTRATE
COMPLIANCE REQUIRED BEFORE LICENSE REVOCATION
OR SUSPENSION?
INTRODUCTION
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)I prescribes proce-
dural standards that administrative agencies must observe when car-
rying out their rule-making 2 and adjudicatory functions2 Section
558(c) of the APA, which deals specifically with licensing procedures,
states in part that federal agencies must provide licensees with an
"opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance" with license
qualifications before their licenses are suspended or revoked. 4 Some
1. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), repealed and superseded by Government
Organization and Employees Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
2. "Rule making" means any process for formulation, amendment or repeal of
any "rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976). "Rule" is defined as "an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect" whether interpretative, substan-
tive or procedural. Id. § 551(4); see Department of Justice, Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 12-16 (1947 & reprint 1973) (signifi-
cance of distinction between rule making and adjudication) [herein' r,'r cited as
Attorney General's Manual].
3. Adjudication refers to any process leading to issuance of an agenct, rder." 5
U.S.C. § 551(7) (1976). "Order" is defined as any "final disposition ... of an agency
in a matter other than rule making but including licensing." Id. § 551(6). In Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), the court specifically rejected the notion that
the decision to grant or deny a particular license application is a legislative function.
Id. at 608. The court stated that when a "governmental body grants a license it is an
adjudication that the applicant has satisfactorily complied with the prescribed stan-
dards for the award of that license." Id.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976). This section also requires that the licensee be given
notice before the agency begins termination proceedings. Id.; accord Gallagher &
Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 & n.ll (7th Cir. 1982) (letters warning
licensees of potential suspension and which listed instances of failures to file papers
timely held sufficient notice); see Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454
F.2d 928, 933-34 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (notice insufficient when agency did not indicate
which filing failures led to complaint); Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217,
228-29 (D.C. Cir.) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (notice not sufficient when agency in rule-
making proceeding relied upon past violation not found willful until the hearing),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961); Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d 358, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(service of complaint and temporary restraining order that licensee refrain from
further violations of act held sufficient); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 706
& n.23 (D.D.C. 1957) (notice of impending hearing and a "short simple statement of
the matters of fact and law to be considered and determined" sufficient) (quoting
Rule III(a) of the SEC), af 'd on other grounds per curiam, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958). Agency notification that was factually inaccurate
in details but did not mislead the licensee has been held to be sufficient notice prior to
license suspension. Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 883-84 (8th Cir. 1977). In addi-
tion, § 558(c) provides that in cases of emergency or willful misconduct by the
licensee, procedural requirements of notice and opportunity to comply are not appli-
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courts have interpreted this "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve"
language of the second sentence of section 558(c) as requiring that
agencies adhere to the procedures that the APA outlines for formal
adversarial hearings in all license revocation proceedings. 5 The Sev-
enth Circuit, however, in Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 6 rejected
this interpretation as inconsistent with both the plain meaning and the
legislative history of section 558(c) .7 The court stated that the "sole
purpose of the second sentence was to provide a licensee threatened
with the termination of its license an opportunity to correct its trans-
gressions before actual suspension or revocation of its license re-
sulted. '"8 According to this interpretation, the section merely affords
the licensee the separate safeguard of an opportunity to comply with
license qualifications. 9 If the licensee then fails to demonstrate compli-
ance, termination proceedings are instituted.' 0 Other applicable sec-
tions of the APA," the statute giving the agency authority over the
cable. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976). The willfulness, however, must be "manifest" before
an agency may terminate a license without prior notice and some chance for the
licensee to respond or comply. H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as House Report], reprinted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S. Doe. No.
248, 233, 275 (1946) [hereinafter cited as APA Legislative History]; S. Rep. No. 752,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in APA
Legislative History, supra, at 185, 211; see Eastern Produce Co. v. Benson, 278 F.2d
606, 609 (3d Cir. 1960) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b), recodified at 5 U.S.C. §
558(c) (1976)). "Willfulness" under the APA has been interpreted to include pro-
scribed acts either "'intentionally" committed, whether innocently or maliciously
motivated, or negligently committed without regard for lawful requirements. Good-
man v. Benson, 286 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1961); see Capitol Packing Co. v. United
States, 350 F.2d 67, 78-79 (10th Cir. 1965). Notice requirements have been held to be
"superfluous" when the licensee was the "corporate successor" of a willful violator.
Van Wyk v. Bergland, 570 F.2d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 1978).
5. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); New York Patho-
logical & X-Ray Labs. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975); see Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1073 (1977).
6. 687 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1982).
7. Id. at 1074.
8. Id.
9. Id.; Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 933-34
(D.C. Cir. 1971); see Glover Livestock Comm'n Co. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 114
(8th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n
Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d
819, 821 n.2 (1st Cir. 1965); Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 228-29
(D.C. Cir.) (Fahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961).
10. See Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982);
Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 933-34 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
11. Section 554 states that it applies if another statute requires that an agency's
adjudications be "determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 54-55 and accompa-
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licensed activity,12 and due process,13 all of which govern agency
adjudications, determine the procedures that must be followed in
conducting these proceedings.
This Note addresses the issue whether the second sentence of section
558(c) requires a hearing with all the procedural safeguards that the
APA outlines for formal adversarial hearings before a license is sus-
pended or revoked. In Part I, this Note examines the language and
legislative history of the APA and concludes that rather than requiring
a formal hearing, the second sentence of section 558(c) provides the
licensee with a "second chance" to comply with license qualifications.
It then examines the procedures that must be followed to ensure that
the licensee is given that chance. Part II analyzes whether informal
compliance proceedings that are consistent with the goals of the APA
also satisfy the constitutional due process requirement that an individ-
ual not be deprived of property without an opportunity to be heard.
After examining the factors that should be considered in formulating
procedures that are consistent with due process, this Note concludes
that informal compliance proceedings can satisfy that constitutional
requirement.
I. COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 558(c)
A. Licensing
Prior to the enactment of the APA, administrative procedures had
been criticized for being conducted "without regard for due process
and in violation of cherished ideas of fair play."1 4 Licensing proce-
nying text. If § 554 applies, the procedural safeguards outlined in §§ 556-557 also
apply. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra note 19 and accompa-
nying text. Section 555 applies to both formal and informal agency proceedings. It
outlines ancillary procedural safeguards including the right to be represented or
advised by counsel, to obtain a transcript of evidence required by the agency, to
request the agency to issue subpoenas, and to receive prompt notice with a brief
explanation for denial of any application or petition. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Colorado v. Veterans Admin., 602 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1979)
(holding that pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), monetary claims
against schools for overpayments to non-eligible students must be determined in
court and not by agency proceedings), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Ashbaker
Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 328-30 (1945) (holding that pursuant to 47
U.S.C. §§ 307-310 (1976), FCC grants broadcast licenses to qualified applicants after
considering public convenience and necessity in comparative hearing).
13. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33, 335-39 (1976) (apply-
ing due process to HEW determination of eligibility for disability benefits pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 421(b), 423 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 399-402 (1971) (same).
14. Woltz, Preface to Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), at vi (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Final Report]. By the late 1930's, there was a pervasive feeling
that many of the newly established administrative agencies were not treating parties
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dures in particular were vulnerable to this criticism because Congress
had delegated substantial licensing authority to federal agencies.' 5
Rather than divesting agencies of their extensive regulatory authority,
which would have interfered with the efficient operation of the licens-
ing process,' 6 Congress, attempting to minimize the potential for
injustice, enacted section 558(c) of the APA to ensure that licensees
had a meaningful opportunity to protect their interest in engaging in
the regulated, and often lucrative, activities that require federal li-
censes. 17
whose actions they regulated fairly. Id.; House Report, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted
in APA Legislative History at 242; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 1, reprinted in
APA Legislative History at 187; see Vanderbilt, Legislative Background of the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act, in Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the
Administrative Agencies 1, 13 (G. Warren ed. 1947).
15. Years ago, the Supreme Court recognized the need for Congress to delegate
regulatory authority to protect the public welfare effectively. In United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), the Court stated that "when Congress had legislated
and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act. . . 'power to fill up the
details' by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations." Id. at 517
(quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)). By specific
legislation, Congress has delegated licensing power to numerous agencies that de-
velop expertise in the fields for which licenses are required. See, e.g., Packers and
Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 203 (1976) (the Agricultural Marketing Service
(AMS) licenses registered dealers and agents engaged in buying and selling livestock);
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, id. § 499c(a) (AMS licenses market agents
dealing in agricultural commodities); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311-1312 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (EPA issues licenses permitting point
source discharge of pollutants into navigable waters); Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5841(0 (1976) (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses all
aspects of construction and operation of nuclear power plants); Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Communications
Satellite Act of 1962, id. §§ 701-757 (the FCC issues licenses for radio and television
stations for individuals and corporations offering interstate communications services
by wire, radio or microwaves, and others including ham, aviation and marine radio
operators); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980) (the Secretary of Transportation issues certificates of public convenience and
necessity for air carriers); id. § 1424 (operating certificates to air carriers satisfying
safety standards); Interstate Commerce Act (as amended), revised by Act of Oct. 17,
1978, 49 U.S.C. § 10,521 (Supp. IV 1980) (the ICC licenses motor carriers providing
transportation of persons and property moving interstate or between the states and a
foreign nation); id. § 10,922 (ICC issues certificates of public convenience for motor
carriers).
16. The drafters of the APA were concerned that the Act not unnecessarily
interfere with the administrative process. As Senator McCarran, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, indicated to the full Senate, his Committee had endeavored
"to make sure that no operation of the Government is unduly restricted." Senate
Report, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 4, at 191.
The Senator was convinced that "no administrative function [was] improperly af-
fected." Id.; 92 Cong. Rec. 2150 (1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra
note 4, at 301.
17. See Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 936 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). The APA defines licenses broadly as any agency "permit, certificate,
1983] 1439
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Section 558(c) provides licensees with an "opportunity to demon-
strate or achieve compliance" with license qualifications before their
licenses are suspended or revoked. Licensees threatened with termina-
tion of their licenses argue that this "opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve" language of section 558(c) is a hearing requirement that
triggers the procedural safeguards for formal adversarial hearings
described in sections 556 and 557.18 These procedural safeguards in-
clude: 1) an impartial presiding officer; 2) the right to present evi-
dence and to cross-examine; and 3) the right to have the decision
based on the record and supported by reliable, probative and substan-
tial evidence.' 9 To determine whether these procedural safeguards
apply to the "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance,"
that language must be examined in the context of the statute as a
whole, 20 and in light of its legislative history.2 '
B. Statutory Construction of Section 558(c)
1. Express Language
a. Section 558(c)
Section 558(c) provides in relevant part:
Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health,
interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspension,
approval . . . exemption or other form of permission." 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (1976).
Thus, licenses such as a certification of medical facilities for performing the labora-
tory tests required for aliens seeking permanent residency status, see New York
Pathological & X-Ray Labs. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975), a construction or
operating permit for a nuclear power plant, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 526 (1978); Porter
County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1366 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and the right to practice before
the Securities and Exchange Commission, see Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701,
704-05 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958), are all covered by the APA. As such, none of these
may be suspended or revoked unless the agency has complied with the second
sentence of section 588(c).
18. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1072 (7th Cir. 1982);
Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1367-68 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see New York Pathologi-
cal & X-Ray Labs. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The hearing officer or adminis-
trative law judge is authorized to administer oaths, issue subpoenas, receive relevant
evidence, take depositions, handle procedural questions, and control the course of the
hearing. Id. § 556(c) (1976). His decision must be based on the entire record of the
hearing. Id. § 557(c); see id. § 556(e).
20. See 92 Cong. Rec. 2146, 2150 (1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History,
supra note 4, at 302. See generally 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46.05 (4th ed. 1973).
21. See 2A C. Sands, supra note 20, § 48.02.
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revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the
institution of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been
given-
(1) notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which
may warrant the action; and
(2) opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all
lawful requirements.
22
The section does not outline the procedure that is necessary to ensure
an "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance." 23 Some
courts apply the procedural requirements for hearings outlined in
sections 556 and 557 to proceedings conducted pursuant to section
558(c) .24 A literal reading of section 558(c), however, does not suggest
that these procedures are necessary. 25 Sections 556 and 557 state that
they apply to adjudicatory proceedings when section 55426 of the APA
specifically requires that their procedures be followed.2 7 The second
sentence of section 558(c) makes no reference to either a hearing or to
sections 556 and 557. 2 s Because other sections of the APA refer explic-
itly to "hearings,"' 29 Congress' failure to use the term3" in section
558(c) suggests that it did not intend to create an independent formal
hearing requirement when it enacted the section. 3' Additionally, the
22. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976).
23. See id.
24. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); New York Patho-
logical & X-Ray Labs. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975). In New York
Pathological, although the court seemed somewhat confused whether the case pre-
sented a question of denial of an application or revocation of a license, it relied upon
the second sentence of § 558(c) to establish that a formal hearing was required. Id. at
82. The plaintiff had engaged in the activity for about 25 years before the agency
required that it be licensed. Id. at 81.
25. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1976). Section 554 applies to agency adjudications when
another statute requires that such adjudications be determined "on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 554(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra
notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
27. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
28. See id. § 558(c) (1976).
29. Id. §§ 553(c), 554(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 553(c) also requires a
formal hearing in certain rule-making situations. Formal proceedings are necessary
for agency rule-making whenever the statute provides for a hearing "on the record"
in haec verba or substantially similar words. See United States v. Florida E. Coast
Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,
406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972). See generally Robinson, The Making of Administrative
Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Proce-
dure Reform, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1970).
30. A maxim useful for statutory construction is expressed by the phrase expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (anything not expressly stated is intended to be excluded).
See 2A C. Sands, supra note 20, § 47.23.
31. Cf. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 104-05, 5 Wheat. 35, 47-48
(1820) (omission of description from one section indicated that descriptive words of
1983] 1441
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first sentence of the section, which deals with license applications,
refers to sections 556 and 557.32 Congress' failure to repeat this lan-
guage in the second sentence suggests that it did not intend the proce-
dural safeguards of those sections to apply to proceedings conducted
pursuant to that sentence. 33
b. Section 558(c) in the Context of the Statute as a Whole
An examination of both the purpose of the APA34 and the way that
its different sections work together 35 supports this conclusion. The
preamble36 of the APA states that it was designed to "improve the
administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative proce-
dure. ' 37 The fairness of a particular administrative procedure de-
pends not only upon the rights and expectations of licensees, but also
upon the public interest and the burdens placed on the administrative
agency. 38 Thus, the "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve" language
another section should not be incorporated into first section); United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (use of specific term in one section
indicated that term should not be implied in section where omitted); Pena-Cabanillas
v. United States, 394 F.2d 785. 789 (9th Cir. 1968) (same); Pennsylvania Agricultural
Coop. Marketing Ass'n v. Ezra Martin Co., 495 F. Supp. 565, 570-71 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (same).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976).
33. Cf. Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (enumerated
exceptions indicated that omission of others was intentional); Marshall v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246, 1251 (3d Cir. 1980) (inclusion of standard in one
section and exclusion in another indicated that exclusion was intentional).
34. Courts should give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature. Philbrook
v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); see Conoco, Inc. v. Federal Regulatory
Comm'n, 622 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1980). If a statute is capable of two construc-
tions, the construction that carries out the manifest object of the statute should be
followed. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979);
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948).
35. Separate parts of a statute should be interpreted in harmony with one an-
other so that the statute is understood as a unified composition. United States v.
Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.D.C. 1978); 2A C. Sands, supra note 20, § 46.05.
Senator McCarran emphasized that the coherence and interrelatedness of the parts of
the bill enacted as the APA must be taken into account when interpreting it. 92
Cong. Rec. 2150 (1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 4, at 302.
36. What the legislature said in the text of the statute is "the best evidence of the
legislative intent or will." 2A C. Sands, supra note 20, § 46.03. The "preamble
expresses in the most satisfactory manner the reason and purpose of the act." Id. §
47.02(3).
37. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra
note 4, at 1.
38. As summarized by the Attorney General in his recommendation of the Act to
Congress, the APA was intended to provide the "hopeful prospect of achieving
reasonable uniformity and fairness in administrative procedures without at the same
time interfering unduly with the efficient and economical operation of the Govern-
ment." Letter from Tom Clark, Attorney General, to the Chairman of the Senate
1442 [Vol. 51
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should be construed to maximize the "fairness" to all parties interested
in the license termination, and not necessarily to require formal adju-
dicatory hearings when such hearings would not be in the best inter-
ests of the licensee, the public and the administrative agency.3 9 In
certain circumstances, the interest of fairness40 may be better served
by less formal procedures. 4' For example, whenever the agency's de-
termination of non-compliance is based on a factual occurrence such
as the timely filing of documents, it would be unfair to require the
government to expend fiscal and administrative resources to provide
elaborate procedural safeguards that would not lead to a more accu-
rate determination of compliance or a more equitable resolution of the
dispute. 42 A formal hearing, therefore, does not always serve the
purpose expressed in the preamble of the APA.
Analysis of other parts of the APA suggests that if the APA is to be
read as a unified composition, 43 the "opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve compliance" does not create a right to a formal hearing, and
that the safeguards of sections 556 and 557 do not apply. The first
sentence of section 558(c) requires that an agency conduct "pro-
ceedings ...in accordance with sections 556 and 557 ...or other
proceedings required by law" to determine whether a license should
be granted to an applicant. 44 Although referring to sections 556 and
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 19, 1945), reprinted in Attorney General's Manual, supra
note 2, at 123, 124; see 92 Cong. Rec. 5645 (1946), reprinted in APA Legislative
History, supra note 4, at 344 (remarks of Rep. Sabath) (President vetoed the earlier
Walter-Logan bill because it failed to achieve proper balance among private, public
and agency interests).
39. Cf. Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 659 F.2d
1140, 1159-60 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (when Congress intended to create a balance be-
tween union and management power, statutory language should not be construed to
give the union too much power), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); Raven v. Panama
Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (when Congress intended to exclude
nonresident alien from coverage of statute, word "individual" in statute should be
read to exclude nonresident aliens), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979).
40. As noted by one commentator, "[flairness seems to dictate a procedural
minimum of notice, comment, and reasons before informal adjudication can be
legitimated." Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 739, 757 (1976).
41. See House Report, supra note 4, at 17, reprinted in APA Legislative History
at 251; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in APA Legislative History at
194.
42. See Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982).
43. See supra note 35.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976). License applicants have argued that the first
sentence of § 558(c) entitles them to a formal hearing. Taylor v. District Eng'r, U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); United States Steel Corp.
v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833-34 & n.13 (7th Cir. 1977); see Seacoast Anti-Pollution
League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.Il (1st Cir.) (court disagreeing that § 558(c)
independently requires a hearing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Marathon Oil
Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff relying upon United States
Steel Corp.'s interpretation of § 558(c)).
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557,45 the sentence recognizes that these sections do not apply when
"'other proceedings" are sufficient. 46 When the statute authorizing the
agency to grant licenses or due process require that this authority be
exercised after a hearing, 47 the first sentence of section 558(c) requires
that the hearing conducted meet the specific procedural requirements
of sections 556 and 557.48 In the absence of such a requirement, 4
however, the procedures required by the agency enabling legislation
satisfy this sentence of section 558(c).50 If no procedures are specified
in the statute authorizing the agency to grant licenses, the agency is
free to devise procedural measures that are consistent with the goals of
the enabling legislation, the APA and the Constitution. 5' This sen-
tence, therefore, does not create a statutory right to adjudicatory
hearings. 52 Rather, it requires that the proceedings mandated by other
statutes or the Constitution be conducted "with due regard for the
45. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976).
46. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.11 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Taylor v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978).
47. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Federal Reserve Board,
upon disapproval of any application to become a bank holding company, shall hold a
hearing and either approve or deny application "on the basis of the record made at
such hearing."); 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission "in any
proceeding ... for the granting ... of any license ... shall grant a hearing ... on
each application.").
48. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.11 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Taylor v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d
1253, 1260 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977).
49. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973) (12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27 (1976
& Supp. V 1981) applications for banks evaluated after investigation into condition
"by means of a special commission ... or otherwise"); Yong v. Regional Manpower
Admin., 509 F.2d 243, 245 (9th Cir. 1975) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1976 & Supp. V
1981) applications for entry by aliens approved after determination of need for
skilled workers in alien's field made by state labor commission).
50. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.11 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Taylor v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d
1253, 1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977).
51. See Taylor v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337
(5th Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977).
In Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 824 (1978), the court remarked that "[t]he most that can be said is that
Congress assumed that most licensings would be governed by §§ 556 and 557" formal
hearing requirements. Id. at 878 n.l1.
52. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.ll (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Taylor v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d
1253, 1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 12:10, at
450 (2d ed. 1979); Rolfe, The Requirement of Formal Adjudication Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: When is Section 554(a) Triggered so as to Require
Application of Sections 554, 556 and 557?, 11 Envtl. L. 97, 120-21 (1980).
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rights and privileges of all the interested parties . . . and within a
reasonable time." 53
Similarly, section 554 of the APA does not create a right to a formal
adjudicatory hearing. Section 554 states that the procedural safe-
guards of sections 556 and 557 must be followed when agency ena-
bling legislation requires that adjudications be "determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing."' 54 If the enabling
statute does not contain this requirement, section 554 does not ap-
ply. 55 Accordingly, the requirements of sections 556 and 557 need not
be met because those sections apply to adjudicatory hearings only if
those hearings are required by section 554.56 To be consistent with this
scheme of safeguarding existing hearing rights, the "opportunity to
demonstrate or achieve" language of the second sentence of section
558(c) should not be construed as creating a right to a formal hearing.
2. Legislative History
The legislative history also demonstrates that Congress did not
intend to create rights to hearings when it enacted the APA. 57 Both the
House and Senate Reports state that the APA does not require formal
agency hearings unless a hearing is required by another statute.58
53. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976); accord Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253,
1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977); Attorney General's Manual, supra note 2, at 89.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a), (c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). When disputes arising under
these statutes cannot be settled informally, the agency is required to afford the
interested parties notice and a hearing in accord with sections 556 and 557. Id. §
554(b)-(c) (1976).
55. See, e.g., Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1072 (7th Cir.
1982) (holding that APA does not by itself require agency to hold a hearing);
Colorado v. Veterans Admin., 602 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that APA
does not create rights to hearings when they do not already exist), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1014 (1980); New York Pathological & X-Ray Labs. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 84 n.1
(2d Cir. 1975) (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing that right to formal hearing must be
found outside the APA); Sisselman v. Smith, 432 F.2d 750, 754 (3d Cir. 1970)
(holding that APA requires U.S. Coast Guard to hold adjudicatory hearing only
when another statute so requires). See generally Rolfe, supra note 52, at 115-20;
Note, The Requirement of Formal Adjudication Under Section 5 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 12 Harv. J. on Legis. 194, 205-15 (1975).
56. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
57. See House Report, supra note 4, at 10, 14, 17, reprinted in APA Legislative
History at 244, 248, 251; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6-8, reprinted in APA
Legislative History at 192-94. A statute should be construed in light of its legislative
history. See 2A C. Sands, supra note 20, § 48.02.
58. House Report, supra note 4, at 10, 14, 17, reprinted in APA Legislative
History at 244, 248, 251; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6-8, reprinted in APA
Legislative History at 192-94. The Senate Judiciary Committee had earlier explained
the operation of the Act stating: "Limiting application of the sections to those cases in
which statutes require a hearing is particularly significant, because thereby are
excluded -the great mass of administrative routine . . . and a variety' of similar
matters in which Congress has usually intentionally or traditionally refrained from
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According to these reports, the APA outlines some of the procedures
that must be followed in formal adjudicatory hearings when hearings
are required A9
Nor does the legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended
to eliminate informal proceedings when it enacted the APA.6 0 Con-
gress was aware that "informal procedures constitute the vast bulk of
administrative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of the adminis-
trative process."' 6 1 The enactment of sections 556 and 557 describing
specific procedural safeguards applicable to agency hearings, there-
fore, was not an expression of Congress' dissatisfaction with the fair-
ness and effectiveness of informal proceedings. 2 Rather, those sections
were designed to ensure "reasonable uniformity and fairness in ad-
ministrative procedures without. . . interfering unduly with the effi-
cient and economical operation of the Government."' 63
Informal proceedings often may be the best means of achieving the
goal of fair, efficient agency action. 64 For example, whether an appli-
cant is qualified to engage in certain areas of banking depends upon
"congeries of imponderables . . . calling for almost intuitive special
judgments. ' 65 Under these circumstances, according to the Attorney
requiring an administrative hearing." Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Comm. Print 1945) [hereinafter cited as Committee Print],
reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 4, at 22; accord Attorney General's
Manual, supra note 2, at 41; Letter from Tom Clark, Attorney General, to the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 19, 1945), reprinted in Attorney
General's Manual, supra note 2, at 124.
59. House Report, supra note 4, at 10, 14, 17, reprinted in APA Legislative
History at 244, 248, 251; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6-8, reprinted in APA
Legislative History at 192-94.
60. The Congressional reports emphasize the importance of the APA's public
notice provisions, which apply broadly to informal and formal agency actions, and
state that "some functions and some operations may not lend themselves to formal
procedure." House Report, supra note 4, at 17, reprinted in APA Legislative History
at 251; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in APA Legislative History at
194. Moreover, § 554(c) requires agencies to afford an opportunity for informal
settlement of disputes when practicable. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1976). Congress intended
agencies to develop whatever informal procedures are appropriate. Committee Print,
supra note 58, at 9, reprinted in APA Legislative History at 24; see Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual, supra note 2, at 48-49. Pursuant to § 552, the agency must publish the
means it provides for informal settlement and other informal proceedings. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(1)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61. Committee Print, supra note 58, at 9 (quoting Final Report, supra note 14, at
35), reprinted in APA Legislative History at 24; see Final Report, supra note 14, at
35-42.
62. See Committee Print, supra note 58, at 9, reprinted in APA Legislative
History at 24. See supra note 60.
63. Letter from Tom Clark, Attorney General, to the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 19, 1945), reprinted in Attorney General's Manual, supra
note 2, at 124.
64. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
65. Attorney General's Comm. on Admin. Proc., Final Report of the Attorney
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General's Report on Administrative Procedure, 6 which Congress re-
lied upon when drafting the APA,67 careful and conscientious investi-
gation that affords reasonable time to present rebutting evidence and
arguments is more useful than formal hearings .6
Furthermore, the House and Senate Reports indicate that section
558(c) was designed to prevent agencies from exceeding their statutory
authority to impose penalties or sanctions on private parties whose
actions they regulated .6 The second sentence of the section limits this
authority by precluding revocation or suspension of licenses if the
licensee has not been afforded an opportunity to correct the conduct
questioned by the agency.70 A licensee is thus protected from arbitrary
General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, S. Doe. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
143 (1941).
66. Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Final Report of the
Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1941).
67. See House Report, supra note 4, at 12, reprinted in APA Legislative History
at 246 (Congressional documents "indicate the care with which the recommendations
of [the Attorney General's Committee] have been studied in framing the present
bill."); Senate Report, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in APA Legislative History at 190
("In the framing of the bill [the Senate Judiciary] committee has had the benefit of
the factual studies and analyses prepared by the Attorney General's Committee.");
id. at 6, reprinted in APA Legislative History at 192 (The bill finally enacted as the
APA "follows generally the views of good administrative practice as expressed by the
whole of [the Attorney General's] Committee."). Moreover, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, in explaining its proposed bill, published a detailed comparison of its bill
complete with references to parts of the Attorney General's Committee's Final Re-
port. See Committee Print, supra note 58, reprinted in APA Legislative History at 11.
68. Attorney General's Comm. on Admin., Final Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 142-
43 (1941).
69. House Report, supra note 4, at 40, reprinted in APA Legislative History at
274; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 25, reprinted in APA Legislative History at 211;
see 92 Cong. Rec. 2158 <1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 4, at
322-23; Attorney General's Manual, supra note 2, at 88. As noted by Representative
Walter, specific provisions governing agency licensing were needed to "remove the
threat of disastrous, arbitrary, and irremediable administrative action." 92 Cong.
Rec. 5654 (1946), reprinted in APA Legislative History, supra note 4, at 368.
70. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982); see
Attorney General's Manual, supra note 2, at 90-91. As the court stated in Blackwell
College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the licensee
must be given the chance "to put [his] house in lawful order" before his license can be
terminated. Id. at 934; accord George Steinberg & Son v. Butz, 491 F.2d 988, 993-94
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Glover Livestock Comm'n Co. v.
Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Butz v.
Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary
of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 821 n.2 (1st Cir. 1965); see Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d
358. 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (judicial proceedings before administrative action to
revoke license afforded an opportunity to show or achieve compliance); American
Fruit Purveyor's, Inc., 30 Agric. Dec. 1542, 1577-81, 1581 (1971) (§ 558(c) requires
an opportunity for a "second chance" and "cannot be reduced to a mere informal
notice requirement.").
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terminations by the second chance to "correct its transgressions" and
thereby avoid termination altogether. 71
Neither the APA nor its legislative history indicate that the proce-
dures necessary to give the licensee an opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve compliance must meet the specifications of sections 556 and
557.72 Rather, the second chance is a procedural protection in addi-
tion to those that are otherwise required.
7 3
C. Procedural Requirements
Compliance proceedings conducted pursuant to the second sentence
of section 558(c) must provide the licensee with a meaningful opportu-
nity to appeal to the discretion of administrative officials.7 4 The proce-
dures required to ensure this meaningful opportunity depend upon the
relative interests involved. For example, in Gallagher & Ascher Co. v.
Simon, 75 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
agency's practice of affording licensees an opportunity to object to
warning letters or suspension notices on an informal basis constituted
sufficient opportunity to show compliance. 76 In Blackwell College of
Business v. Attorney General,77 however, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that a similar procedure allowing
the licensee an opportunity to respond to warning letters with docu-
mented evidence did not satisfy section 558(c) .8
This apparent inconsistency can be attributed to the difference in
the relative importance of the interests involved. The court in
Gallagher suggested that a customs broker's interest in maintaining
the right to receive goods without prepaying fees was not as significant
as the government interest in preventing abuse of this licensing privi-
lege. 79 In Blackwell College, however, the court noted that in com-
71. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982): see
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 353 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1957)
(Burton, J., dissenting) (stating that § 9(b) advances purpose of APA by protecting
licensee from summary license revocation).
72, See supra notes 22-71 and accompanying text.
73. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982). See
supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. The determination whether a formal
hearing is also necessary before revocation depends upon whether the decision is
"required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982)
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
74. Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 936 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
75. 687 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 1075-76.
77. 454 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 934-35.
79. 687 F.2d at 1078.
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parison to the interest of the licensee in maintaining its approved
status as an educational institution for foreign students, the interest of
the government was not that substantial.80 As these rulings illustrate,
the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a licensee has a
meaningful "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance" re-
quire an analysis of the particular interests that the threatened termi-
nation affects.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND SECTION 558(c)
A. Protecting the Property Interest in a License
Because a licensee has a property interest"' in a license, 82 the proce-
dures for taking away that license must comply with the due process
80. 454 F.2d at 935 & n.ll.
81. The Supreme Court has held that certain interests are constitutionally pro-
tected property rights meriting procedural safeguards of due process. See, e.g.,
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978) (municipal
utility service), North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08
(1975) (use of bank account), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1972) (possession
of chattels purchased on installment plan); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261
(1970) (welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42
(1969) (employee's wages). Since the early 1970's, however, lower courts have in-
sisted that the property right be positively substantiated by state or other law. Thus,
in Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit stated that a
protected property interest "results from a legitimate claim of entitlement created
and defined by an independent source, such as state or federal law." Id. at 1040;
accord Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 686 F.2d 758, 760 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983); Ledford v. Delancey, 612 F.2d 883,
886 (4th Cir. 1980); Roane v. Callisburg Indep. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 638 (5th
Cir. 1975); O'Neill v. Town of Nantucket, 545 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D. Mass. 1982).
The Supreme Court has applied similar reasoning to distinguish between mere expec-
tation and entitlement to determine whether due process was applicable. See, e.g.,
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 784-85 (1980) (Medicaid
provisions not entitling nursing home patients to stay in the home of their choice);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976) (holding that sufficiency of policeman's
claim to hearing before termination depends upon state law). Compare Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (recognizing untenured faculty's cogniza-
ble interest in future employment when the school's practices created de facto tenure)
with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (holding that untenured
faculty had no protected expectation of future employment). See generally L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 10-7, at 506, §§ 10-9 to 10-10 (1978).
82. E.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 & n.11 (1979) (state horse trainer's
license issued by the Racing and Wagering Bd.); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10
n.7 (1979) (state-issued driver's license); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977)
(same); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (license to drive an automobile);
Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1982) (special term
permit issued by U.S. Customs officials); Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir.
1981) (license from state Board of Psychological Examiners); Blackwell College of
Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (school's approved
status as an educational facility issued by INS); Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294
F.2d 217, 225 (D.C. Cir.) (certificates for nonscheduled air carriers), cert. denied,
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requirement 83 that an individual not be deprived of property without
an opportunity to be heard.8 4 Thus, even if the APA does not literally
require that a licensee be given a formal hearing in which to demon-
strate its compliance, or if the agency enabling legislation does not
provide for a formal hearing before a license is revoked, due process
may require one. 5
To determine what procedures are necessary to satisfy the opportu-
nity to be heard requirement of due process, the private interests
affected by the threatened governmental action, the likelihood of
erroneous deprivation or benefit from additional procedure and the
governmental interest in efficient and effective protection of the pub-
lic must be considered. 86 If it is concluded that due process requires a
formal hearing for compliance proceedings, that requirement must be
read into the "opportunity to demonstrate" language of section 558(c)
to preserve its constitutionality. 87 For example, in Wong Yang Sung v.
366 U.S. 965 (1961); Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp. 263, 268-69 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(state-issued liquor license).
83. E.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S.
1, 10 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971); Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1982);
Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1981); Blackwell College of Business v.
Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp.
263, 268-69 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
84. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). Another requirement of due process is notice.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Supreme
Court stated that in order to be adequate, notice must be "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. The
Court remarked that the right to be heard would have "little reality or worth unless
one is informed" of matters to be decided. Id. As remarked by Justice Frankfurter in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, "rarely has [Congress] authorized [adminis-
trative] agencies to act without those essential safeguards for fair judgment which in
the course of centuries have come to be associated with due process." 341 U.S. at 168
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
85. See Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1982);
Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 934-35 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
86. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). For examples of judicial
analysis of the process that is due when property rights were at risk, see Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-66 (1979); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-19 (1979);
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
340-49 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-66 (1970); Gallagher & Ascher
Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1076-79 (7th Cir. 1982); Goichman v. Rheuban
Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1982); Justice v. Fabey, 541 F. Supp.
1019, 1023-24 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Jones v. Morris, 541 F. Supp. 11, 15, 19-21 (S.D.
Ohio 1981), afJ'd mem., 455 U.S. 1009 (1982); Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp. 263,
269 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
87. As the Supreme Court stated in The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v.
Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903), "[i]n the case of all acts of Congress, such interpretation
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McGrath,8 the Supreme Court read a formal hearing requirement
into the section of the Immigration Act dealing with deportation,
noting that due process requires formal procedures because deporta-
tion involves "issues basic to human liberty and happiness and
, . . perhaps to life itself." 89 Consequently, the Court held that the
APA provisions outlining the requirements of formal hearings must be
observed in deportation proceedings.90 Thus, whether due process
requires that section 558(c) proceedings comply with the safeguards
outlined in sections 556 and 557, despite the literal language of that
section, is determined by balancing the relevant interests. 91 The
weight accorded to these competing interests varies depending upon
the factual circumstances of each case.
B. Balancing Interests in Compliance Proceedings
1. Gravity of Private Interests
Federal administrative agencies have the authority to issue licenses
to engage in various commercial and private activities. 92 The gravity
of the private interest affected depends upon the type of license threat-
ened with termination. For example, an occupational license autho-
rizes a licensee to pursue a particular means of earning a living. 93
Termination of this license substantially affects the licensee, often
depriving him of his chosen source of livelihood, as well as the value of
the time and money invested in preparing for and pursuing that
livelihood.9 4 Congress and various federal agencies, recognizing the
ought to be adopted as, without doing violence to the import of the words used, will
bring them into harmony with the Constitution." Id. at 101; accord Anderson v.
Edwards, 505 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (S.D. Ala. 1981).
88. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id. at 50-51.
91. See Gallagher & Aseher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1982);
Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
92. See supra note 15.
93. See Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 Va. L.
Rev. 1097, 1102-03 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Due Process Limitations]; see, e.g.,
New Banner Inst., Inc. v. Dickerson, 649 F.2d 216, 217 (4th Cir. 1981) (gun
salesman), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 1015 (1982); Glover Livestock Comm'n Co. v.
Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 111 (8th Cir. 1972) (livestock market agent), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973); H. P.
Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 820 (1st Cir. 1965) (customs
broker); Dietze v. Siler, 414 F. Supp. 1105, 1106 (E.D. La. 1976) (river pilot);
Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D.D.C. 1957) (right to practice before
the SEC), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 927 (1958).
94. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1297
(1975); Due Process Limitations, supra note 93, at 1102-03, 1105. Courts more
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importance of this interest, often specifically provide by statute or
regulation for a formal hearing before termination of an occupational
license. 95
Other licenses, however, such as special permits allowing the li-
censee to expedite his business96 or to provide services to selected
categories of persons, 97 confer a preferred status. Termination of these
licenses does not prevent the licensee from pursuing his trade or
business. For example, a customs broker can still function without the
special permit that allows him to receive imported goods before he has
paid duties on them.9" Without such a permit, he either can pay the
duties before he receives the goods or, if possible, use the permits of his
customers. 99 In either case, he is not deprived of his livelihood. Recog-
nizing that an interest in a preferred status is less substantial than an
interest in one's livelihood, Congress and agencies have provided for
termination of licenses conferring preferred status without specifically
readily require notice and an opportunity to be heard when occupational licenses are
at stake. 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 147 (1965).
95. E.g., Department of Agriculture Appropriation Act (as amended), 7 U.S.C.
§ 204 (1976) (provides for suspension of registered livestock market agents after notice
and hearing); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499h (1976)
(provides for license suspension for brokers or dealers in agricultural goods after
hearing); Federal Gun Control Act (as amended), 18 U.S.C. § 923(e) (1976) (pro-
vides for a hearing before revocation of a license required for manufacturers and
salesmen of firearms); 27 C.F.R. § 178.73 (1982) (regulations of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms provide for a hearing before license revocation); id. §
178.75(a) (hearing provided after revocation as long as licensee's request for a hear-
ing is "timely"); Customs-House Brokers Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (requires a hearing before suspension or revocation of a license for a customs
broker). Pursuant to its enabling statute, the SEC promulgated Rule II(e), which
provides that "[t]he Commission may disqualify, and deny, temporarily or perma-
nently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person
who is found by the Commission after hearing" to be unqualified. Schwebel v.
Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 703 n.9 (D.D.C. 1957) (quoting Rule II(e)), aff'd on other
grounds per curiam, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
96. Term special permits, issued by the Customs Service, allow brokers to expe-
dite importation of goods by paying duties and filing necessary papers after the goods
are released by agency officials. 19 C.F.R. §§ 142.21-.29 (1982); see Gallagher &
Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1069 (7th Cir. 1982).
97. Regulations of the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) specify that
medical exams required for aliens seeking permanent residency status may be pro-
vided only by those facilities approved by the agency. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.6 (1982). In
New York Pathological & X-Ray Labs. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975), the court
held that such agency approval is a lawfully required license. Id. at 82 & n.7. Other
INS regulations provide for approval of educational facilities for nonimmigrant
aliens. 8 C.F.R. § 214.3 (1982); see Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen.,
454 F.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (such a status is "a valuable asset in the nature of
a license.").
98. See Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1982).
99. See id. (discussing use of customer's permits).
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requiring a formal hearing. 100 If merely a preferred status is at stake in
a compliance proceeding, the balance may weigh in favor of effi-
ciency and the public interest, and thus an informal proceeding will
satisfy due process.' 10
2. Risk of Wrongful Deprivation
An agency must consider the "[f]acts pertaining to the parties and
their businesses and activities"10 2 to evaluate a licensee's compliance
with prescribed license qualifications.1 3 A formal adversarial hearing
is the best forum for adducing these facts.10 4 If the risk of erroneous
deprivation is minimal10 5 or if the decision depends upon objective
results of examinations,10 6 however, the virtues of formal hearings10 7
are often outweighed by their inefficiencies. 08 For example, when the
seaworthiness of a vessel is in question, formal proceedings do not
100. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.4(b)-(c) (1982) (Although INS regulations afford a
school threatened with termination of approved status an opportunity for a hearing,
the director is authorized to revoke approved status if the licensee does not respond to
agency warnings or request a hearing.); 19 C.F.R. § 142.25(a) (1982) (Customs
regulations, without provision for a prior hearing, authorize district director to
terminate special permit when licensee repeatedly fails to file papers and make duty
payments in timely fashion.). Agency practice, however, must afford the licensee an
informal opportunity to show or achieve compliance before termination is appropri-
ate. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1982).
101. See Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982).
102. 2 K. Davis, supra note 52, § 12:3, at 413. Davis distinguishes these "adjudica-
tive" facts from "legislative" facts that aid the decision-maker in determining ques-
tions of policy and law but do not specifically concern the disputing parties. Id.
103. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964). Congress recognized
that license revocation is an adjudicatory function. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (1976)
(specifically includes licensing in definition of adjudication). Licensing covers any
agency process regarding licenses including the "grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
suspension .... modification, or conditioning of a license." Id. § 551(9).
104. See 2 K. Davis, supra note 52, § 12:1; 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 7.02 (1st ed. 1958). But see Friendly, supra note 94, at 1268 (approach
using adjudicative/legislative fact dichotomy is limited, and other factors should be
considered).
105. For instance, when an agency's decision depends upon verification of a
straightforward factual occurrence, such as the timeliness of filing documents and
paying fees, and is subject to several levels of administrative review, the risk of
erroneous deprivation is at a minimum. See Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687
F.2d 1067, 1069, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. For instance, a student's eligibility to continue studies at medical school
depends upon satisfactory academic performance measured by objective tests and
professorial review of clinical performance. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 80-81, 86 n.3 (1978).
107. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
108. Final Report, supra note 14, at 36-38; see 2 K. Davis, supra note 52, § 12:12.
The Attorney General's Committee, which extensively studied operations of federal
administrative agencies shortly before enactment of the APA, recognized that when
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increase the likelihood of a correct resolution of the issue;' 0 an inspec-
tor can test the vessel by prescribed standards. 0 The results of the test
determine whether the vessel's owner has brought the ship into com-
pliance with the qualifications for seaworthiness," 11 and thus whether
further termination proceedings should be instituted. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the procedural safeguards of con-
frontation and cross-examination do not reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation when a decision must be based on medical records and
affidavits submitted by experts." 2 Under these circumstances, the
time and expense of formal procedures are not justified because they
do not diminish the likelihood of erroneous deprivation.
Furthermore, the fact that the licensee has an opportunity to com-
ply with license qualifications substantially diminishes the likelihood
of any deprivation. The licensee not only has an opportunity to chal-
lenge the termination proceeding, 1 3 but he also has the opportunity to
correct his wrongful conduct,' ' 4 and thereby avoid the initiation of
further termination proceedings.
3. Governmental Interests and Administrative Burdens
A federal agency has an interest in efficiently accomplishing the
regulatory functions that Congress has assigned to it. 1 When the
administrative decisions depend upon objective tests, formal procedure, although
possible, provides "no added protection" and at times, through delay, endangers the
public. Final Report, supra note 14, at 37. When Congress enacted the APA, it
specifically exempted decisions of this nature from formal hearing requirements. 5
U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (1976).
109. Final Report, supra note 14, at 36-37. As pointed out in the Final Report,
greater protection is afforded by agency scrutiny of the skill and integrity of its
examiners and the potential for administrative review of agency decisions. Id. at 37-
38; see 46 U.S.C. § 390(c)(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (certificates of inspection
stating that passenger and freight steamships are in compliance with pertinent safety
rules and regulations of the Coast Guard).
110. 46 U.S.C. § 391(d) (1976).
111. Id. Congressional reports to the APA excluding such proceedings from formal
hearing requirements pointed out that "those methods. . . do not lend themselves to
the hearing process." House Report, supra note 4, at 27, reprinted in APA Legislative
History at 261; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 16, reprinted in APA Legislative
History at 202.
112. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976).
114. Id. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
115. For example, the Customs Service has an interest in preventing abuses of the
immediate release rights afforded by special term permits, and in the collection of
revenue. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982). The
INS has an interest in enforcing U.S. immigration laws, promoting better relations
with foreign nations, and protecting the interests of bona fide nonimmigrant alien
students. Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 935 & n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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governmental interest protected by the license requirement is substan-
tial in relation to the private interests affected, the need for efficient
agency administration and to conserve limited agency resources justi-
fies procedures that are less burdensome to the agency. For example,
in Gallagher &Ascher Co. v. Simon, 1 6 the court held that the govern-
ment's interest in prompt collection of revenue outweighed the li-
censee's interest in maintaining a preferred status." 7 Consequently,
expenditure of "scarce fiscal and administrative resources" on proce-
dures in addition to the informal hearing already provided was not
justified."" In Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General,119
however, the court held that the government's interest in promoting
better foreign relations and protecting the interests of bona fide for-
eign students did not outweigh the licensee's interest in retaining its
preferred status license. 120 Because the government's interest could
"just as easily be protected by better procedures," better procedures
were required.121
Depending upon the interests involved, the opportunity to comply
may require a full hearing despite the efficiencies of less formal pro-
ceedings.122 If, however, extensive procedures will not reduce the
likelihood of wrongful deprivation, informal proceedings may be suf-
ficient.123 Because due process is a flexible concept 1 24 and does not
require a formal hearing for all compliance proceedings, reading such
a requirement into section 558(c) is not necessary to preserve its consti-
tutionality. The procedures that are necessary to ensure that the li-
censee has an adequate opportunity to be heard in a particular com-
pliance proceeding depend upon the nature of the license and the
burden of providing more formal procedures. 25 Formulation of these
procedures is best left to the agency that governs the licensed activ-
ity. 2 The availability of judicial review is a check upon this agency
116. 687 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. Id. at 1078.
118. Id.
119. 454 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
120. Id. at 935 & n.ll.
121. Id. at 935 n.l1.
122. See Due Process Limitations, supra note 93, at 1126-28.
123. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
124. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
125. See supra notes 86, 91 and accompanying text.
126. See Attorney General's Manual, supra note 2, at 48 ("[The] precise manner in
which [informal] opportunities are to be afforded has been deliberately left by
Congress to development by the agencies themselves."). This approach was approved
years ago by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), in
which the Court remarked that once. "Congress had legislated," as it has in delegat-
ing licensing authority to regulatory agencies, "it could give to those who were to
act . . . 'power to fill up the details' by the establishment of administrative
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authority, 27 ensuring that the procedures provided do in fact satisfy
due process.
CONCLUSION
Section 558(c) of the APA provides federal licensees with a "second
chance" to comply with license qualifications before revocation or
suspension proceedings are instituted. The section does not address the
issue whether a formal adversarial hearing is required if further termi-
nation proceedings are necessary. That issue can be resolved by refer-
ence to the statute granting regulatory authority to the agency in-
volved, other applicable sections of the APA and the requirements of
due process. Because section 558(c) does not describe the procedures
that are necessary to ensure that the licensee is properly afforded a
second chance, the agency must devise procedures that, consistent
with the goals of the APA and due process, provide the licensee with a
meaningful opportunity to show its compliance. When properly af-
forded, this opportunity to rectify the conduct that led to the initia-
tion of agency proceedings, and thereby avoid termination altogether,
protects the licensee's interests in a manner that the procedural safe-
guards outlined in sections 556 and 557, which at best ensure a fair
hearing, cannot.
Geraldine F. Baldwin
rules . Id. at 517 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43
(1825)). When revocation procedures have been specifically provided by statute, the
result is often inflexible and inefficient. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6510 (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 16 (1981 & Supp. 1982). See generally
Lanzarone, Professional Discipline: Unfairness and Inefficiency in the Administra-
tive Process, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 818 (1983).
127. The APA provides broadly for judicial review of agency actions stating that
"[a] person suffering legal wrong ... or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action. . . is entitled to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Two exceptions are
also provided when: "1) statutes preclude judicial review; or 2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." Id. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme Court has
narrowly construed these exceptions. Judicial review of the constitutionality of the
Veterans' Benefits Act was not barred despite statutory language that the Veterans'
agency "decisions. . .on any question of law or fact under any law administered" by
the agency be "final and conclusive." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974)
(emphasis deleted).
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